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This analysis presents the results of a survey of agricultural producers in Mississippi
regarding their use of contracting. The study focuses on cross-commodity di¤erences
in contracting and the variable underlying contracting. Logistic regression models are
used to examine the impacts of variables coming from transactions cost economics and
risk on contracting decisions. Support is found for the e¤ects of transactions cost, but
price risk is not found to be an important determinant of contracting decisions.
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1 Introduction
Contracting in agriculture is not a new phenomenon. However, the increasing role
of concentration and industrialization in agriculture has refocused attention on the type
and extent of use of contracts in agriculture. Data from Perry and Banker suggest that
the use of contracting has increased, in some cases dramatically, over the past …ve years
(Table 1). The available data also show considerable disparity in the use of contracting
across commodities. Di¤ering degrees of “industrialization” (Drabenstott) may be used to
describe di¤erences across commodities, but industrialization is broadly de…ned and some-
what amorphous. A closer examination of the underlying fundamental di¤erences between
commodities may be more fruitful in gaining perspective on the reasons for di¤erences in
contracting across commodities.
Empirical examination of contracting has understandably been focused on the poul-
try and hog sectors (Goodhue, Rausser and Simon; Gillespie and Eidman; Martin; Klieben-
stein and Lawrence; Johnson and Foster; Hennessey and Lawrence), although some work in
fruits and vegetables has been done as well (Hueth et al.). However, examination of Table
1 shows that contracting is increasing in …ber, …eld crops and other livestock as well.
Contracting in agriculture is somewhat di¢cult to de…ne because of the broad range
of potential contract types. Market transactions occur on a continuum ranging from spot
transactions to complete vertical integration (i.e., coordination through direct ownership of
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the productive resources). Contracts are typically viewed as lying close to spot transactions,
but some contract types such as resource providing and production management contracts
(Kohls and Uhl) take on characteristics of quasi-integration. Kohls and Uhl provide the
following de…nitions for these contracts:
² Resource providing contract–a contract with terms that often specify certain pro-
duction resources to be used and the place of their purchase. The contractor usually
provides the producer with …nancing ranging from operational to …xed investment …-
nancing, and a degree of managerial assistance and supervision. Product prices are
usually based on the open market, and income guarantees are minimal. In such con-
tracts, the contractor may in‡uence the technology and size of operations of the pro-
ducer in order to increase and stabilize the market for their own products. Examples
of these may lie in some fruit, nut, vegetable, and ornamental horticulture contracts.
² Production management contract–a contract with terms that often include mar-
keting and production stipulations of both the resource providing and market (cash
forward) contracts. In addition, they provide for the transferring of part or all of the
market price and income risks from the producer to the contractor. This is usually
done by paying the producer a prearranged return per unit of product or by guarantee-
ing against market-oriented …nancial loss. In these contracts, the contractor assumes
a substantial part of the managerial responsibility of the producer. These contracts
come closest to obtaining the managerial and …nancial control and risk that occurs when
the integration is e¤ected through complete ownership (complete vertical integration).
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Examples are poultry and some hog contracts.
Some contracts such as cash forward contracts and marketing pools are viewed as simple
marketing tools from the producer’s perspective. However, the supply chain management
uses and implications of these contracts suggests that a broader, vertical coordination view
of these tools is warranted. Viewing traditional marketing tools in this fashion may bear
fruit in understanding why producers contract.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, primary data collected on contracting
behavior and underlying fundamental explanatory factors for a cross-section of Mississippi
farms is presented. Second, these data are used to o¤er some perspective on the role that
theoretically important variablesmay be playing in contracting decisions. The purpose is not
to provide a comprehensive analysis of contracting, per se, but to provide some perspective
on di¤erences across commodities and outline future research needs.
2 Related Literature
There is a rich literature in the area of vertical integration and coordination. Within
this literature, transactions cost economics has emerged as a primary explanatory tool for
examining contracting and vertical integration relationships (Williamson 1979, 2000). Un-
like neoclassical economic theory, transactions cost economics assumes that transactions do
not occur in a frictionless environment. Rather, transactions cost theory holds that the
cost of carrying out a transaction in the marketplace will have a direct e¤ect on the vertical
stucture of the market/…rm. Despite criticsms of the transactions cost theory as tautological
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(Slater and Spencer; Williamson, 2000), there has been empirical support for the hypotheses
generated from transactions cost theory (see, e.g., Lieberman; Joskow; Hobbs; Levy). De-
spite the evidence found in general markets, little examination of agricultural markets has
been conducted, and those studies in agriculture are in a commodity-speci…c context, which
limits generalization of …ndings to other commodities.
2.1 Transactions Cost
Williamson (1996) provides a description that is useful in understanding the contracting
decision. Assume there are two potentially di¤erent pro…t functions:
¼
i = R(X) ¡ C (X;k;®) ¡ °k ¡ Gi; and
¼
m = R(X) ¡ C (X;k;®) ¡ °k ¡ Gm
where ¼i is the pro…t associated with contract type i, ¼m is the pro…t associated with spot
sales, R(X) is the revenue associated with selling a given output X, C (X;k;®) is a twice
di¤erentiable, concave cost function, k is the degree of asset speci…city1 with a per unit cost
of °, Gi and Gm are the governance costs2 associated with contract type i and spot sales,
respectively, and ® is a shift parameter. It is assumed that CX > 0, Ck < 0, and CXk < 0.
1 Asset speci…city is de…ned as the magnitude of economic costs associated with redeploying an asset to its
best alternative use, and by its best alternative user (Williamson, 1979; Klein, Crawford and Alchain). Two
key concepts associated with asset speci…city are quasi-rents and the ”hold-up” problem. A quasi-rent is
the di¤erence between the best alternative return on the capital before it is invested and the return it must
receive to prevent alternative use after the capital has been invested (Hennessy and Lawrence). The hold-up
problem arises when the buyer of the product attempts to appropriate the rents from the seller by forcing
disadvantageous contractual terms on the seller. The buyer has this leverage over the seller because the
seller has invested in speci…c assets that are costly to redeploy.
2 Governance costs can be any number of items related to managing a relationship. Examples may be
searching out buyers, negotiation contracts, monitoring and enforcement of contracts, etc.
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A higher value of ® has a greater cost reducing consequence for asset speci…city: Ck® < 0
and CX® < 0.
Assume that governance costs are given by:
Gi = ¯ + V (k); and
Gm = W(k)
where ¯ > 0 is the bureaucratic cost parameter and Vk ¸ 0 and Wk > 0. Further, it is
assumed that Wk > Vk for all common k, or the marginal cost of governance with respect to
asset speci…city is greater for spot markets than for any type of contract. It is clear from
this that output will be chosen to equalize marginal revenue with marginal production cost,
while optimal asset speci…city will be chosen to minimize joint production and governance
costs.
Examining pro…t as a function of asset speci…city yields a central hypothesis (Figure
1). It is assumed that the level of output chosen is optimal for each level of asset speci…city.
There is only one pro…t function for spot sales, but a family of pro…t relations for contracts
of di¤erent types depending on the bureaucratic cost parameter ¯. The choice of mode
of production depends on the pro…t relation with the highest peak. For example, with a
relatively low bureaucratic cost, ¯1, contracting would be chosen. By contrast, spot sales
would be chosen when the bureaucratic cost parameter, ¯2, is relatively high. Clearly, then,
it is the relative transactions cost between spot sales and contracting that determines the
mode of production. Thus, important variables to examine are variables that relate to
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transactions cost.
The above model also has bearing on the impact of asset speci…city on the contracting














The …rst order conditions from pro…t maximization from above suggests that Xi > Xm
and ki > km. Given the assumption that production cost between i and m are equal, then
¼i
® > ¼m
® . Therefore, as asset speci…city has a greater cost-reducing impact, contracting
will be preferred to spot sales. Viewed from another direction, asset speci…city can lead to
“hold-up” problems and appropriation of rents. To avoid this rent appropriation, producers
are more likely to contract as asset speci…ty increases. Thus, this model also suggests that
examining asset speci…city is also important.
2.2 Risk and Risk Shifting
Much emphasis has been placed on the role of risk in contracting and vertical integration
(Allen and Lueck, 1995). Risk matters in economic organization from an expected utility
framework as has been shown by Stiglitz. Attention has been paid to the risk shifting
properties of contracts (Sheldon) and at least some researchers hypothesize that risk a¤ects
contracting decisions in agriculture (Hobbs; Kleibenstein and Lawrence).
Risk averse producers are assumed to be willing to forgo some level of income, called
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a risk premium, in order to have some assurances about minimum income. Thus, the
expectation is that, holding risk aversion constant, increases in risk will lead to a greater
use of contracting. Similarly, holding risk constant, increases in the level of risk aversion
will lead to a greater use of contracting. Despite the theoretical arguments, little support
for the e¤ects of risk (speci…cally, yield risk) on contracting have been found in agriculture
(Allen and Lueck; Le-er and Rucker). Nevertheless, the apparent importance of risk from
a theoretical perspective implies the need to at least examine the role of risk.
Another factor related to risk is income diversi…cation. An increasing percentage of
farm household income is derived from o¤-farm sources. This diversi…cation of household
income may lead to decreased risk exposure and, therefore, lead to an increased willingness
to take on additional risk in the farming enterprise. Similarly, crop diversi…cation also has
overall risk reducing properties, and is thus, another variable of interest in understanding
contracting decisions.
3 Mississippi Producer Survey
Togain some perspectiveon thevariablesimportant tocontracting froma cross-commodity
perspective, a survey of agricultural producers in Mississippi was conducted. Mississippi
was chosen because it has a diverse set of agricultural producers ranging from traditional row
crops to livestock to fruits and vegetables. The questionnaire was designed to elicit basic
information on several factors: farm size, crops grown, primary and secondary crop price ex-
pectations, level of autonomy in decision-making, involvement of lender in decision-making,
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perceptions about contracting, demographics, and contracting activity (type and provisions
of contracts). The questionnaire was pretested on several producers and Extension personnel
and revised according to their suggestions.
A random sample of 1,000 producers was drawn by the Mississippi Agricultural Sta-
tistics Service and strati…ed by major crops grown in the state: …eld crops, fruits, vegetables,
nuts, cattle, and other livestock. The breakdown of the population and sample sizes are
shown in Table 2. To insure an adequate sample size for vegetables, fruits, and nuts, these
groups were oversampled. The livestock sample was somewhat complex. First, the sample
did not target poultry producers because the characteristics of their contracts were already
generally known. For the same reason, the sample did not target hog producers that were
known to be contract growers. Several of the responding hog producers were producing
under either resource providing or production management contracts, but most were selling
their hogs on cash forward contracts or in spot markets.
The sample of cat…sh producers was restricted to those with $500,000 in annual
sales or more, and cattle producers were restricted to those with 1,000 head or more. These
restrictions were introduced to insure that responding producers were commercial producers
and not “hobby” farmers. Inclusion of hobby farmers might introduce a signi…cant het-
erogenity of motivations for farming, thereby masking important results for those producers
who produce the preponderance of the product.
The survey was conducted by mail during the Spring of 2001. A cover letter explain-
ing the bene…ts of participation and assurances of information con…dentiality was included
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to increase response rates (Pennings, Irwin and Good). A Dillman three-wave survey tech-
nique was used to mitigate non-response bias: the …rst wave included a questionnaire and
cover letter; the second wave consisted of a reminder card; the third wave another copy of
the questionnaire and a second cover letter.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Out of the original 1,000 surveys mailed, 56 were returned due to an incorrect address,
leaving an e¤ective sample of 944. An additional 67 were returned as out of business and
16 were returned as out of scope (prison farms, research farms, etc.), leaving a …nal viable
sample of 861. A total of 361 responses were returned, giving a response rate of 38%. After
accounting for incomplete responses, there were 265 usable responses or a usable response
rate of 31%.
The descriptive statistics of the relevant variables for the full sample are shown in
Table 3. The CVP variable is the coe¢cient of variation of price for the primary product
produced. The coe¢cient of variation is a measure of price risk, which was derived from
the respondents expectations of price (Keefer and Bodily). Thus, the CVP is an expected
price risk variable for the primary crop produced. On average, respondents expected prices
to vary by 20.41%. HOURS represents the number of hours per week spent gathering and
analyzing market information, which is a transactions cost. Respondents reported spending
an average 1.17 hours per week on this task. The measure of diversi…cation used in this
survey was o¤-farm income (OFFINC). On average, respondents reported that 53.89% of
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their household income was derived from o¤-farm sources. Asset speci…city (ASSETSP)
measures the percentage of total farm assets that can be used in the production of only one
product. Respondents reported that an average 41.06% of assets were of this type.
A primary variable of interest was the respondent involvement in contracting. A
producer was considered to engage in contract production if that producer sold a crop on
cash forward contracts or through a pool, or was engaged in production under a resource
providing or production management contract. On average, 14% of the respondents reported
being engaged in contract production under that de…nition (CONTRACT1). However, one
could argue that inclusion of marketing pools in a de…nition of contracting is questionable
because: (1) the marketing pool is just a simple extension of cash marketing that involves
joint marketing and (2) the motivations for participation in a pool may be di¤erent than
those for particpating in other forms of contracting. The CONTRACT2 variable re‡ects
the percentage of responding producers who participated in any other form of contracting
except marketing pools. As can be seen, this percentage is much smaller at 7.9%.
Little can be deduced from Table 3 about the e¤ects of these variables on contracting
or the di¤erences in these variables across commodities. The means of the relevant variables
were computed for di¤erent groups of commodities and these results are presented in Table
4. The …rst group only includes cotton producers. This group was isolated because of
its relative importance to Mississippi. The “Field Crops” group includes all corn, soybean,
rice, wheat and sorgum respondents. The “FNVO” group includes all fruit, nut, vegetable
and ornamental horticultural producers. The “Livestock” group includes all cattle, hogs,
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and cat…sh producers. Finally, the “Unclassi…ed” represents the respondents who did not
provide their primary product name, and the “Other” group includes all those respondents
who reported “Other” as their primary product.
Price risk for traditional row crops is perceived to be generally lower than for the
FNVO group.3 This likely stems from the fact that the markets for FNVO products are
smaller and are subject to much larger potential changes in price over a growing season.
It should be that these are perceived price risk measures, and are not derived from actual
transactions price data. Purely from a risk perspective, then, we would expect to see higher
levels of contracting in FNVO crops than in row crop agriculture. However, examination of
the measures of contracting (CONTRACT1 and CONTRACT2) shows that contracting in
row crops is much higher than contracting in FNVO or Livestock categories. Thus, while
risk may be important, it certainly does not appear to be the most important factor. This
result supports previous empirical …ndings by Allen and Lueck that suggest that risk is not
an important factor in choosing to contract.
A second important factor is transactions cost, which is represented by HOURS.
Here, it can be clearly seen that row crop producers spend more time gathering market
information than either FNVO or Livestock producers. Higher transactions cost should
lead to a greater use of contracting, which appears to be supported by the data. While the
numerical values for the number of hours per week appear small, the data suggest that cotton
3 In what follows, the Unclassi…ed and Other categories will not be discussed. The remaining discussion
will be focused on drawing distinctions between the di¤erent crops grown by the producers. However, the
regression analysis does contain the observations on these other groups because crop was not a variable in
the model.
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producers, for example, spend over twice the time gathering market information as compared
to livestock producers. Thus, while the absolute numbers appear to be inconsequential, the
relative di¤erences may help explain some of the di¤erences observed in contracting.
There appear to be di¤erences in the level of income diversi…cation as well. Cotton
producers have the lowest level of income diversi…cation of the commodities analyzed. As
such, one would expect this group to have the highest level of contracting. Again, this
hypothesis appears to be supported by the data. In addition, the FNVO and Livestock
groups have the highest levels of income diversi…cation, and correspondingly have the lowest
levels of contracting activity.
Finally, the level of asset speci…city appears fairly constant across crops, with the
exception of livestock. One would expect that higher levels of asset speci…city would lead
to more use of contracting. However, for livestock, the data do not support this hypothesis.
It could be that other factors such as o¤-farm income are counteracting the e¤ects of asset
speci…city. It is interesting to note, however, that only FNVO or Livestock producers
responded as having participated in resource providing or production management contracts,
which are closer to vertical integration than spot markets. Thus, perhaps asset speci…city is
important for these more complex forms of vertical integration. The regression model was
used to control for these potential counter-vailing e¤ects.
4.2 Regression Results
A logistic regression model was used to analyze the impacts of the variables above on
the probability that a producer is engaged in contract production:
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Pr(CON = 1) = f(CV P;HOURS;PREF;EASE;ASSETSP;EDU;OFFINC;AGE);
where CON = 1 if the producer is engaged in contract agricultural production for their
primary product; CON = 0 otherwise. In the …rst estimated model, contract production
was assumed to be cash forward contracts, marketing pools, resource providing contracts,
and production management contracts. The variables PREF and EASE are Liekert scale
questions.
² PREF – “I prefer to concentrate on farming/producing relative to marketing my prod-
ucts.”
² EASE – “Contracting is easier to do than sell my products in the open market.”
These variables were scaled as 1 being strongly agree to 5 being strongly disagree to these
statements. EDU is the level of education of the respondent: EDU = 1 if respondent was a
college graduate; EDU = 0 otherwise. Finally, AGE is the age of the respondent in years.
The results of the regression model are presented in Table 5. The results suggest that
price risk is not an important factor in determining contract participation, which appears
consistent with the results above. These results also lend further support to the hypothesis
of Allen and Lueck that risk is not important in contracting. It is important to note that
this does not mean that producers are risk neutral, it simply implies that other factors are
more important than price risk in participation in contracting.
The coe¢cient on the HOURS variable is positive and statistically signi…cant, sug-
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gesting that transactions cost are important in contract participation. The sign on this
coe¢cient implies that as the amount of transactions cost increases, contracting increases.
There may be some reason to believe that the number of hours used examining market
information is simultaneously determined with whether or not to contract. However, one
may also argue that examination of market information may reveal the complexities and
di¢culties in marketing, thus leading those producers to deduce that transactions cost are
high and lead them to a greater use of contracting.
This hypothesized relationship may also be re‡ected through the attitudinal vari-
able EASE. In this case, producers who strongly disagreed that contracting was easier to do
than selling in spot markets were signi…cantly less likely to participate in contracting. Con-
versely, those that agreed with the statement were signi…cantly more likely to participate
in contracting. This result suggests that perceptions about ease of contracting compared
to spot marketing, which can be construed as a transactions cost (opportunity cost on the
producer), signi…cantly in‡uences contracting decisions. There is no clear reason for the
positive sign on the coe¢cient for the PREF variable. On one hand, one might expect that
those respondents who prefer to concentrate on farming (strongly agree to the statement)
might simply contract the crop to simplify marketing decisions. However, one might also
argue that those who prefer marketing are more inclined to spend signi…cant time and money
searching out buyers and information, and would therefore be more likely to contract. Nei-
ther story is particularly compelling, but the results suggest that producers’ preferences for
farming versus marketing signi…cantly in‡uences contracting decisions.
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Asset speci…city does not appear to be signi…cantly in‡uencing contracting decisions.
However, with a p-value equal to 0.13, one may argue that it does play some role. The sign
on the coe¢cient for ASSETSP is as expected. Increases in the level of asset speci…city
tend to increase the probability of contracting, but the level of statistical signi…cance is weak.
College graduates are signi…cantly more likely to contract and older producers are less likely
to contract.
A second logisitic regression model was also estimated. In this model, the de…nition
for contracting was con…ned to include cash forward contracts, resource providing contracts,
and production management contracts. Marketing pools were not considered contracting
in this model because it may be argued that the motivations for participating in marketing
pools is somewhat di¤erent than the motivation for participation in other contract types.
The results of the second regression model are shown in Table 6.
As with the previous model, price risk does not signi…cantly a¤ect contracting deci-
sions. Thus, even with a more restrictive de…nition of contracting, price risk does not appear
to play a signi…cant role. Also similar to the previous model, transactions cost as re‡ected
by HOURS, as well as attitudinal variables signi…cantly a¤ect contracting decisions. Unlike
the previous model, asset speci…city appears to signi…cantly in‡uence contracting decisions.
Thus, under a more restrictive de…nition of contracting, asset speci…city appears to in‡uence
producer decisions. It should be noted that asset speci…city was marginally statistically sig-
ni…cant in the full model, so this result only strengthens the conclusion that asset speci…city
is important.
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Restricting the de…nition of contracting appears to diminish the importance of edu-
cation, but increase the importance of o¤-farm income. Education was weakly signi…cant in
the previous model, so the fact that education is not signi…cant in the second model is not
surprising and suggests that education is only a marginal indicator of contracting decisions.
In contrast, restricting the de…nition of contracting appears to increase the importance of o¤-
farm income. This may mean that diversi…cation is not a factor that in‡uences participation
in marketing pools, but does play a role in other forms of contracting.
5 Conclusions
Overall, this analysis suggests that the predictions of transactions cost economics appear
robust in a cross-commodity setting. That is, prior evidence from other studies have shown
transactions cost variables to be important within a given commodity. The results in this
study suggest that these variable are generally important across commodities as well, which
provides strong evidence of the e¤ects of transactions cost on contracting decisions.
A second important conclusion of this study is that price risk does not appear to
be a signi…cant factor in contracting decisions. This is consistent with the …ndings of Allen
and Lueck. However, this does not mean that price risk does not a¤ect individual decision-
making (or equivalently, it does not mean that producers are risk neutral). Rather, it simply
means that risk does not in‡uence the decision of whether or not to contract.
Finally, while these results are important in establishing the role of transactions
cost in contracting decisions, they are not particularly useful in answering policy questions
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related to contracting such as what are the costs and bene…ts of contracting and vertical
integration. To accomplish this, we will need to establish the value that producers place
on di¤erent attributes of contracts, such as the degree of risk shifted, the value of asset
speci…city, the value of autonomy in decision-making. This will be the subject of future
research in this area.
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Table 1. Use of Contracting by Agricultural Producers











aVegetables and Fruits were reported together in 1993; Cattle and Hogs were reported
together in 1993.
Source: USDA and Perry and Banker.
21Cross-Commodity Perspective on Contracting: Evidence from Mississippi
Table 2. Population and Sample Sizes, Contracting Survey, Mississippi, 2001.








Source: Mississippi Agricultural Statistics Service
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Relevant Variables, Contracting Survey,
Mississippi, 2001.







CVP is the coe¢cient of variation in expected price for the primary product, Hours is
the number of hours spent collecting and analyzing market information, OFFINC is the
percentage of total household income that is derived from o¤-farm sources, ASSETSP is the
percentage of total assets that can be used in the production of only one output, Contract1
is the proportion of respondents that utilized either forward contracts, marketing pools,
resource providing or production management contracts, and Contract2 is the proportion
of respondents that utilized either forward resource providing, or production management
contracts.
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Table 4. Means of Relevant Variable by Product Categories, Contracting
Survey, Mississippi, 2001.
Variable Unclassi…ed Cotton Field Crops FNVO Livestock Other
CVP 20.92 14.98 18.51 27.22 20.39 19.31
HOURS 0.85 2.55 1.25 1.03 1.05 0.82
OFFINC 60.17 42.82 49.11 59.69 52.14 61.27
ASSETSP 37.65 38.96 38.62 36.42 43.18 49.54
CONTRACT1 0.07 0.56 0.21 0.09 0.07 0.12
CONTRACT2 0.00 0.26 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.04
No. Obs. 43 27 33 32 105 25
CVP is the coe¢cient of variation in expected price for the primary product, Hours
is the number of hours spent collecting and analyzing market information, OFFINC is the
percentage of total household income that is derived from o¤-farm sources, ASSETSP is the
percentage of total assets that can be used in the production of only one output, Contract1
is the proportion of respondents that utilized either forward contracts, marketing pools,
resource providing or production management contracts, and Contract2 is the proportion
of respondents that utilized either forward resource providing, or production management
contracts.
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Table 5. Regression Results, Full Sample, Mississippi, 2001.
Variable Estimate Standard Error Â2 value
Intercept -0.477 1.3105 0.1329
CVP -0.017 0.0259 0.4106
HOURS 0.633 0.1585 15.9410¤
PREF 0.585 0.2086 7.8505¤
EASE -0.494 0.2098 5.5518¤¤
ASSETSP 0.012 0.0079 2.3057
EDU 0.777 0.4306 3.2538¤¤¤
OFFINC -0.006 0.0058 1.1584
AGE -0.043 0.0163 6.8594¤
Log-likelihood Â2 58.576
No. Obs. 264
¤Statistically signi…cant at 0.01 level.
¤¤Statistically signi…cant at the 0.05 level.
¤¤¤Statistically signi…cant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 6. Regression Results, Restricted Sample, Mississippi 2001.
Variable Estimate Standard Error Â2 value
Intercept -1.854 1.6656 1.2385
CVP -0.030 0.0365 0.6867
HOURS 0.467 0.1904 6.0096¤¤
PREF 0.707 0.2513 7.9176¤
EASE -0.681 0.2513 6.9115¤
ASSETSP 0.021 0.0099 4.6386¤¤
EDU 0.620 0.5452 1.2927
OFFINC -0.016 0.0077 4.4550¤¤
Age -0.017 0.0208 0.6681
Log-likelihood Â2 39.624
No. Obs. 264
¤ Statistically signi…cant at the 0.01 level.
¤¤ Statistically signi…cant at the 0.05 level.
¤¤¤ Statistically signi…cant at the 0.10 level.












Figure 1: The Impacts of Governance Costs on the Choice of Contracting.
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